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CHICAGO-KENT

Round Table
A Case in Admiralty
The April luncheon and meeting of the
Round Table was held on Saturday,
April 6th, at the Electric Club. Our own
faculty was represented by the speaker
of the day, Donald Campbell, A.B., LL.B.,
who is Professor of Law of Partnership
and Corporations at Chicago-Kent. Professor Campbell is the junior member of
a Chicago firm which has a large practice in admiralty.
The subject of his talk was, "A Case
in Admiralty."
Professor
Campbell
started in as the cigars were nicely
lighted and the coffee cool enough to
sip. Mr. Campbell said, "The jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in admiralty
and maritime law is given by the Federal
Constitution, and the judiciary legislation." The advantages of admiralty as
to remedies and the simplicity of procedure were pointed out. The substance
of his talk was as follows:
"The broad test of the boundary of
admiralty jurisdiction is limited to acts
and contracts pertaining to rights and
duties of commerce and navigation.
There are modifications of this rule
which tend to define the boundaries with
more nicety. The action may be in tort
or in contract. The act which is the
basis of the action must fall within the
test rule stated above.
"Take for example, a tug boat in the
Chicago River engaged in navigation,
and let us assume that the tug boat has
an accident in which it strikes the Clark
Street Bridge. The bridge is controlled
and operated by the City of Chicago. The
accident was caused by the negligence
of the tug boat, and the question now
presents itself as to whether or not the
City of Chicago can maintain an action
in a court of admiralty to enforce payment of damages to the bridge by the
tug boat.
"We apply the rule-was the City engaged in navigation? It was not, and
the City will therefore have to rely on
the common law for its remedy.
But
suppose we alter the facts, and show that
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the bridge operator wrongfully kept the
bridge down after proper signals from
the tug to raise it. There is an accident, and the tug boat wishes to sue
the City of Chicago In admiralty. We
will apply the test again-was the tug
engaged in navigation? As the question
is in the affirmative, we may say the
tug boat may sue the City of Chicago
in admiralty.
"The owner of a launch Which was
navigating in the lagoon of Lincoln
Park had occasion to assault and punish
two small boys who had taken his tender. This was a tort committed on navigable waters on board a ship engaged in
navigation whereupon an action was
started against the owner of the launch
in admiralty.
"A ship is being built upon the docks
and the material entering into the construction thereof has not been paid for
according to the contract. Will a suit
in admiralty lie? No, in this instance
as far as the boat was concerned it has
never engaged in navigation and as it
stands upon the docks in the eyes of
the court it might as well be a house.
But should the boat be launched, then as
soon as it touches the water it becomes
a fit subject for admiralty jurisdiction,
and should it subsequently be taken into
a dry dock for repairs, according to contract, admirality would have jurisdiction of such contract for repairs.
"Let us start a suit in admirality and
trace it through the usual procedure.
Suit is started by the filing of a libel
which is in the nature of a bill, and the
party bringing the suit is called the
'libellant.' The lawyers are called 'proctors.'
A summons is issued, called a
'monition' and is served by the marshall. Answer to the libel is made by the
'respondant.'
"A libel has its formal parts much as
a bill in equity, and corresponds to the
declaration in a common law action. The
libel should state the nature of the
cause, the names and residence of the
parties, and be followed with a prayer
for relief and process.
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"The libel is In rem or in personam.
If the libel is in rem it must state that
the property which is to be seized is
within the district, whereupon the marshall seizes the property which is usually
a ship. If libel is in personam the action is therefore against the owners of
the vessel and not against the vessel itself, as in the case of a libel in rem.
"The answer should respond explicitly
and distinctly to the allegations of the
libel and should either admit or deny
Them, and should allege such facts as the
respondant relies upon as a defense.
"Either party may file interrogatories
and have sworn answers thereto.
All
pleadings and particularly interrogatories should be positive and explicit.
This tends to narrow the issues in the
case, and as the pleadings are usually less
formal than corresponding pleadings in
either equity or common law, the issues
are more narrowly defined.
"If libel is in rem, the res, which is
usually a ship, should be served by the
marshall tacking a monition on prominant parts of the ship-usually the bridge
and the gangway-and a custodian of the
ship takes the ship in charge.
"If the libel is in personam, the owners of the ship are served, and if the
owners have been served they may limit
the amount of their libel to the value
of the vessel which caused the damage
by having the vessel appraised and by
putting up a bond acceptable to the otlher
party. This, in substance, limits the
amount of recovery in any event to the
appraised value of the ship. The principle
of limitation of liability perhaps originated from the old .common law principle
that the damages ought to be measured
by the value of the object which caused
them.
"There is a further theory, however,
to the effect that when an owner has
equipped a ship and has put it in the
custody of a master and his crew, he
ought not to be held liable for greater
damages than the capital he has invested
in his enterprise, so that shipping and
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thereby trade and commerce, may be
encouraged, if he loses his ship and has
losses sufficient to justify no further
expenditure by himself.
"The case comes on for hearing and
is heard by a judge of the District
Court. The question of liability is decided and then the case is referred to
a commissioner to fix the damages. Because of the technical nature of proving
damages, it is quite convenient and almost necessary that damages be proved
in this way.
"In deciding the liability, the court is
not governed by the common law rule
that contributory negligence is a bar to
the plaintiff's action, and therefore where
the damage is a result of the negligence
of both ships involved in a tort case, the
court may divide the damages and require each boat to pay one-half the
damage done, to the other, but where
there has been an accident and damage
through the clearly perceived and gross
negligence of one of two parties, the court
will not be quick to search for negligence on the part of the other party.
"If there is a difficult question of fact
for the court to decide, he may refer the
case to a jury, but he is not bound to
follow their decision as it is usually considered advisory only.
"Where, however, the ship involved has
touched at ports of call in more than one
state, the parties are entitled to a jury
and trial.
"The judgment having been entered
against the parties, the court will proceed to enforce its judgment by whatever
process is usual and customary, and this
in general follows the common law.
"A seaman injured while engaged in
navigation could formerly recover only
his maintenance and cure: that is, he
was entitled to maintenance during the
time of convalescence plus the cost of
medical attention. Recent legislation has
given him additional rights.
"An action for the wrongful death of
a seaman may usually be maintained by
reason of a state statute giving a right
of action therefore. Passengers who have
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been Injured and shippers of freight may
have their action in admiralty.
"However, many of the common law
remedies have been saved to suitors by
the judiciary acts, and construction of
maritime law in decisions of the courts.
The United States Court has no jurisdiction over boats owned by foreign governments in time of peace, but has jurisdiction over foreign boats in United
States ports privately owned."
Mr. Campbell concluded with the
answering of questions propounded by
the members of the Round Table, and
Judge Pickett in a few well chosen examples connected up many of the statements concerning admiralty with reference to the common law from an historical standpoint.

Gifts to the Library

The College acknowledges with deep
gratitude the gift of Mr. Ossian Cameron,
C'93, consisting of sixty-four books for
the library of the college.
Included
among these are many of the Session
Laws of the State of Illinois which our
library previously lacked, and some other
valuable books. With this gift we now
have the session laws complete from the
year 1893 in addition to some older issues which we already had.
If any alumnus of the College has any
session laws previous to that year and
wouldbe willing to donate the same to
the College Library suitable recognition
will be made in the volume itself and
lusting benefit will be thereby conferred
upon the students of the College.
Sincere appreciation is also hereby expressed for the gift recently made to
the College Library by Dr. Mary Elizabeth
Davenport, '21, consisting of a very
valuable work on the subject of Medical
Judisprudence by Wharton and Stille.
The work consists of three volumes and
covers Mental Unsoundness, Physical
Conditions and Treatment, and Poisons.
Mr. Cameron and Dr. Davenport have
made previous gifts to the college library.
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Important Late Decisions
Quasi Contracts.
The plaintiff performed a surgical
operation upon one B, who obtained admission to a hospital as a charity patient.
The plaintiffs, who were surgeons, were
-ignorant at the time that he was a very
wealthy man. After his death, it developed that he had left an estate of $400,000. Could the doctors recover for the
reasonable value of their services? The
court answered this question in the affirmative, holding that the executors of
the decedent were bound in equity and
good conscience to compensate the surgeons for reasonable services. In re
Agnew's Will, 230, N. Y. Supplement 519.

Agency.
Where a vendor sold portable houses to
the members of a tornado relief committee which was disbursing funds donated
by the public for charitable purposes, and
the vendor agrees that It will look solely
to the fund for payment, then the individual members of the committee cannot
be held; but where the committee disburses the entire fund without inquiry as
to any liability to the plaintiff, then an
individual member of the committee may
be held liable for damages for breach of
contract. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wolf,
246 Ill. App. 515.
Agency-Accounting.
It was held in Johnson v. Milam (Court
of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2,
September 1, 1928), 144 S. E. 346, that, In
a suit upon an account, in which the
issue was whether certain persons who
purchased the goods in behalf of the defendant and for his use were authorized
by him to do so, and In which there was
evidence to show that the transactions
were a continuation of a course of dealing in which like accounts were Incurred
by the same persons" under like circumstances and were paid by the defendant,
and that the agency of such persons to
make the purchases had never been questioned, a finding in favor of the plaintiff

